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Abstract
The activity of the Shadow Banks in China has been the sub-
ject of considerable interest in recent years. Total shadow 
banking lending has reached over 60% of GDP and has 
grown faster than regular bank lending. It has been argued 
that unregulated shadow banking has fuelled a credit boom 
that poses a risk to the stability of the financial system. This 
paper estimates a model of the Chinese economy using a 
DSGE framework that accommodates a banking sector that 
isolates the effects of lending to the private sector includ-
ing shadow bank lending. A refinement of the model allows 
for bank lending including lending by the shadow banks to 
affect the credit premium on private investment. The main 
finding is that while financial shocks are significant, it is 
real shocks that dominate. The model is used to simulate 
the frequency of growth slowdowns in China and con-
cludes that these are more likely to be driven by real sector 
shocks rather than financial sector, including shadow bank 
shocks. This paper differs from other applications in its use 
of indirect inference to test the fitted model against a three- 
equation VAR of inflation, output gap and interest rate.
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1 |  INTRODUCTION
Modelling the Chinese macroeconomy using the DSGE framework has become vogue.1 But there has 
been little effort to model the Chinese business cycle with a banking sector that interacts with shadow 
banking. A notable exception is Funke, Mihaylovski, and Zhu (2015) who develop a detailed cali-
brated DSGE model with a shadow banking sector that incorporates some Chinese economy features. 
Our approach in this paper is different in two respects. First, we employ a variant of the Smets and 
Wouters (2003, 2007, SW) model incorporating the Bernanke et  al. (1999, BGG) framework of a 
banking sector. Second, we take the model to the data and estimate the parameters using the method 
of indirect inference (II). Le, Matthews, Meenagh, Minford, and Xiao (2014) explored such an ap-
proach and reported some success. This paper builds on this work by adding a fuller monetary sector, 
the quantity of money and bank credit, and interaction with a shadow banking sector. The basic idea 
is that the monetary base acts as collateral for loans because it is entirely liquid and riskless. Hence, it 
is a powerful agent of credit growth in a way that has hitherto been relatively neglected in DSGE 
models.
China was not immune to the global financial crisis (GFC). As Le et al. (2014) show, China too 
experienced a severe growth slowdown and like most Western economies has not caught up with its 
previous trend growth rate. The purpose of this paper is to see whether the evolution of the Chinese 
economy during this period can be plausibly explained by such a model and to assess the implication 
of shadow banking activity on the frequency of severe economic slowdowns. The model is used to 
evaluate the effect of the GFC in terms of the frequency of severe economic slowdowns and can be 
used to evaluate whether the Chinese monetary authorities should be engaged in microregulatory pol-
icies that constrain shadow banking activity, or rules-based monetary policy in reducing the frequency 
of financial crisis.
Our empirical procedure is to use the method of indirect inference (II) to test the model on 
some initial parameter values, and then allow the parameters to be moved flexibly to the values 
that maximize the criterion of replicating the data behaviour—indirect estimation. This allows us 
to test the model itself rather than a particular set of parameter values that could be at fault. The 
basic reason for using II over the now popular Bayesian ML is that it tests the overall ability of the 
model to replicate key aspects of data behaviour—there is no guarantee that Bayesian estimates 
will pass this test.
The estimated model suggests that the main shocks hitting China in this sample period were a 
combination of productivity, investment and exogenous (fiscal and trade) shocks but that finan-
cial shocks were only a modest contributor. During the GFC period, the state banking system, 
together with direct government spending, was used to aggressively supplement monetary policy 
offsetting the potential downturn in GDP growth. The model is used to estimate how often we 
might expect to see growth slowdowns in China and how often such slowdowns are driven by 
financial shocks.
The rest of this paper is as follows: in the next section we describe the state of the banking sector 
in China and review the attempts to incorporate a banking sector in DSGE-type models. In the third 
 1Most recently Chang et al. (2015), Chen et al. (2012) and Funke and Paetz (2012)
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section, we set out the model in outline, incorporating the modified BGG framework to the SW model 
and extend it to include direct monetary effects. In the fourth section, we explain our testing procedure 
based on the method of II whereby the model's simulated behaviour is compared statistically with the 
behaviour found in the data. In the penultimate section, we set out the empirical results for the model 
and use these to simulate the frequency of growth slowdowns relative to the assumed BGP and to 
speculate on the causes of future slowdowns. Our final section concludes, with some reflections on 
the implications for China's banking.
2 |  DSGE, (SHADOW) BANKING AND THE 
CHINESE ECONOMY
It is argued that the Chinese economy does not function like a developed market economy and that the 
modelling of the economy must include the distortions of a dominant state sector (Song, Storeslatten, 
& Zilibotti, 2011) that stifles the growth of private enterprise through state capitalism (Huang, 2008) 
and distortions in the labour market (Dollar & Jones, 2013) and a controlled banking system (Chen, 
Funke, & Paetz, 2012; Funke et al., 2015). While there is merit in this argument, we argue that it 
misses the point of using a model as an analytical aid to understand the determinants of the business 
cycle. No economy can realistically be captured by a DSGE model. The purpose of using a DSGE 
model of a variant of the SW framework is to use it to isolate the principal factors that drive the busi-
ness cycle in China even with distorted markets.
DSGE models have been increasingly utilized in modelling the Chinese economy. Zhang (2009) 
calibrated a DSGE model for China to examine welfare implications of a money supply rule versus an 
interest rate rule. Mehrotra, Nuutilainen, and Pääkkönen (2013) use a partially estimated (GMM) and 
calibrated DSGE model based on Christiano, Eichenbaum, and Evans (2005) to evaluate a rebalancing 
of the Chinese economy from investment-led to consumption-led growth, where the labour market is 
assumed to be frictionless but rigidities arise from staggered price setting by firms, habit formation in 
consumption and capital adjustment costs. Technology shocks have a damped effect on output in a 
re-balanced economy. Li and Meng (2006) discuss quantity-based monetary policy rules, Xi and He 
(2010) and Ma (2015) discuss price-based rules, Wu and Lian (2016) analyse hybrid rules and Li and 
Liu (2017) compare the relative performance of alternative quantity and price rules.2 Wan and Xu 
(2010) use Bayesian methods to estimate an open-economy DSGE model and find the standard result 
that technology shocks are the main driver of the business cycle and that they dominate monetary 
shocks. In contrast, Sun and Sen (2011) estimate a Bayesian-modified SW model to examine the busi-
ness cycle and find that technology shocks play a subsidiary role. The dominant drivers of output are 
investment and preference shocks. Most recently Chang, Zheng, and Spiegel (2015) and Cun and Li 
(2016) evaluate optimal monetary policy with sterilized intervention in the FX market using a cali-
brated DSGE model.
Several studies using the New-Keynesian DSGE framework have also been published by 
Chinese scholars (in Chinese). Xu and Chen (2009) incorporate a bank lending channel into a 
DSGE model with price stickiness. They find that technology shocks explain most of the varia-
tions in output, investment and long-term consumption, and the fluctuations of short-term con-
sumption, loans and real money balance are mainly attributed to credit shocks. Xi and He (2010) 
evaluate the welfare losses of China's monetary policy with a New-Keynesian DSGE model and 
 2See Chen et al. (2018) for a review of the unique features and history of evolution of China's monetary policy.
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find that the welfare losses are negatively correlated with nominal interest rate-inflation sensitiv-
ity, and positively correlated with nominal interest rate-output sensitivity. They recommend using 
interest rate policy to stabilize the price level but not to adjust economic growth rate. They also 
find that the welfare losses caused by fluctuations in the money supply are larger than that caused 
by fluctuations in interest rate and conclude that the appropriate intermediate target of monetary 
policy should be the interest rate instead of money supply. Yuan, Chen, and Liu (2011) investigate 
the existence of the financial accelerator within a small open economy. While the financial accel-
erator amplifies the impacts of shocks to the marginal efficiency of investment and monetary 
policy, its amplification effect on the technology and preference shocks is subsidiary. Similar re-
sults are reported in Liu and Yuan (2012). Overall, the Chinese publications are in line with the 
results of those in the international arena.3
The evolution of the Chinese banking system illustrates the broader evolution of its market econ-
omy with Chinese characteristics. Traditionally banking like the rest of the economy has been domi-
nated by the state: state-owned commercial banks (SOCBs) provide credit to state-owned enterprises 
(SOEs). More recently the non–state-owned banks have grown in parallel with the private sector, but 
they also are strongly linked to the state through the shareholding of state-owned companies. Because 
the state banks are closely supported by the government on favourable terms, credit from them also 
finds its way to the private sector via a roundabout route; to the shadow banking system through lend-
ing by state-owned companies that have access to cheap credit and the sale of wealth management 
products (see Buitelaar, 2014; Lu, Guo, Kao, & Fung, 2015). Thus, emerges the peculiarly Chinese 
feature of two parallel systems, separate but connected.
Like many economies that have undeveloped financial and capital markets, the banking sector 
in China plays a pivotal role in financial intermediation. Table 1 below shows that the ratio of total 
bank assets to GDP has increased from 125% in 1997 to 290% in 2016. The market is absolutely 
dominated by the five state-owned banks, although their share of the market has been decreasing 
steadily through competition from the other nationwide banks (Joint-stock banks and some City 
Commercial Banks).
Up until 1995, control of the banking system remained firmly under the government and its agen-
cies. Under state control, the banks in China served the socialist plan of directing credits to specific 
projects dictated by political preference rather than commercial imperative. Traditionally, the PBOC 
 3Among all existing DSGE modelling of Chinese economy, to our knowledge, only three have incorporated a banking sector: 
Chen et al. (2012), Funke and Paetz (2012) and Xu and Chen (2009).
T A B L E  1  The Chinese banking market 1997–2016
Variable 1997 (%) 2000 (%) 2005 (%) 2016 (%)
Total assets to GDP 125.6 147.1 205.1 290.5
SOCB market share % assets 88.0 71.4 52.5 54.91 
Non-performing loans (NPL) ratio 52.7 31.5 10.5 1.7
Return on assets (ROA) 2.32 0.74 1.12 1.21
Average interest rate spread 2.9 3.6 3.3 2.9
Net interest margin (NIM) 1.8 1.5 1.7 2.6%1 
Cost-income ratio SOCB1 40.7 66.3 43.7 31.2
Sources: China Bank Regulatory Corporation Website, Almanac of China's Finance and Banking, Bankscope Data Base, Chinese 
National Bureau of Statistics. World Bank.
12014 data. 
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set loan quotas for each sector and mainly disbursed these through the branch network in each prov-
ince. As China evolved towards a market economy, the banks lagged the rest of the economy in im-
proving its efficiency, management and performance.4 Even with the development of a commercial 
banking system, the state keeps a strong hold on the banking system by maintaining direct control of 
the SOCBs.5 While Table 1 shows a declining share of the market by the SOCBs, state influence re-
mains significant through a complicated process of ownership and governance.
Many of the national joint stock commercial banks (JSCB) are owned by state-owned industries. 
City commercial banks which have geographical limits to their banking activities are owned mostly 
by provincial governments. All banks have a governance structure that includes the oversight of the 
Communist Party and senior officials of the SOCBs are appointed by the government, many who are 
career officials in the politburo.
One reason for the lag in the full commercialization of the banking sector is that the SOCBs are 
seen not just as profit maximizing organizations but also organs of the state in promoting social and 
economic harmony. Profit maximization in the SOCBs is subject to political, social and employ-
ment constraints. Another important reason was the high level of inherited non-performing loans 
(NPLs). Table 1 shows that the NPL ratio of the commercial banks was estimated as 53% in 1997. 
As a preparation for recapitalization and eventual listing, 1.3 trillion RMB was divested to the Asset 
Management Companies in 1999, financed by the Ministry of Finance and the PBOC. In 2004, a fur-
ther 750 billion RMB was divested.
In 2016, NPL ratios had fallen to tolerable levels, although it can be argued that one reason for this 
was the rapid expansion of bank assets during the period of the global economic crisis. Profitability 
and net interest margins have reached comparable levels with banks in developed economies on the 
eve of the global banking crisis. However, the government and the PBOC retain control of the banking 
system through its levers on quantity and price with the objective of hitting a multiplicity of interme-
diate targets. Initially, the objective of price stability and economic growth was to be achieved by 
targets for M1 and M2. By 2007, the PBOC had stopped publishing targets for the money supply. 
Another, but informal, target is the growth of bank credit which is controlled using its administrative 
‘window guidance’ policy. Up until 2004, the rate of interest on loans was strictly controlled. With 
strong controls on the lending rates and high levels of NPLs, ROA and NIM were well below what 
would be expected as appropriate risk pricing by banks in emerging market economies. The recent 
policy of lifting the ceiling on loan rates has created some potential for risk pricing but there is little 
evidence yet that banks are independently pricing risk into their loans and taking advantage of this 
freedom.6
The spread between the benchmark loan and deposit rate has remained largely fixed throughout 
the deregulatory period. However, it is arguable that the average loan–deposit ratio of the SOCBs are 
around 65% and the current capital–asset ratio (CAR) in excess of 10% provides ample slack for the 
banks to make credit advances as and when the government decides through its ‘window guidance’ 
policy. The PBOC have also used the regulated deposit and loan rate benchmarks as monetary policy 
tools. While the plan is to move towards market-determined interest rates over time, the reality is that 
the deposit rate ceiling set by the PBOC remains binding at the time of writing.
 4Estimates of average cost inefficiency of Chinese banks have been in the region of 50%, see Fu and Heffernan (2007) and 
Matthews et al. (2007).
 5The big 4 banks that constituted the SOCBs in 1997 were, Industrial and Commercial Bank of China, Bank of China, China 
Construction Bank and Agricultural Bank of China. By 2006 a fifth bank, Bank of Communication was added to the group.
 6Chen et al. (2011) report that 60% of bank loans remain at the regulated benchmark rate or below it.
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The Chinese banking system, particularly the SOCBs, support the SOEs through directed bank 
credits. The SOEs account for over 50% of the industrial sector, which represents a drop from 70% in 
1999 but the number of enterprises has also declined from a share of 40% in 1999 to less than 10% in 
2008, indicating a sharp increase in individual size and concentration. The average asset size of an 
SOE is around RMB 923 million, compared with the average asset base of a non-SOE at RMB 60 
million.7 Nearly 70% of the funding of the SOEs is from bank loans and nearly 70% of the loan port-
folio of the SOCBs is to the SOEs. About half of GDP is accounted for by the Small- & Medium-sized 
Enterprises (SMEs) and their participation in international trade and outward investment is also very 
significant, representing 69% of the total import and export values and about 80% of outward invest-
ment.8 While it is estimated that 75% of industrial profits are generated by the non-SOE sector, only 
3.5% of the SOCBs lending is to the SMEs.9 With no alternative for funding, China's SMEs10 have 
turned to the shadow banking system which according to PBOC estimates has grown to RMB 30 tril-
lion (half of the total assets of the SOCBs).11
The consolidation of undercapitalized and failing city commercial banks and urban credit cooper-
atives in the 2009–2010 period provides an insight into CBRC resolution strategy. Deposit insurance 
is a very recent innovation in China12 and the depositors of the small failing city commercial and co-
operatives have been quietly compensated by the government. It is therefore inconceivable that any of 
the SOCBs which together account for more than RMB 60 trillion of assets and 1.6 million employees 
are allowed to fail, and unlikely that any of the JSCBs which together have RMB 23.5 trillion and 17% 
of the market by assets be allowed to fail.
The multiple targets and instruments available to the PBOC mean that the methods of monetary 
control require careful interpretation. The seemingly impossible objective of the PBOC is to control 
both price and quantity in the money markets. This is possible because of the undeveloped state of the 
money markets in China which makes interest rate policy less effective, allowing room for quantity 
adjustment.13
The Chinese banking system, state, non-state and shadow, is clearly complex and that its oper-
ations are intervened in by the government in many ways. Here, we necessarily abstract from these 
complexities partly because there is little relevant data and partly because their interactions are hard 
to model. Instead, we model it as if it behaves like an ordinary banking system, facing idiosyncratic 
risk and costs of bankruptcy, the result of which is a credit premium that rises with investment needs. 
Essentially one can think of this as what the marginal investor in the private sector faces as the out-
come of the banking system in China.
As set out above, China's banks lend directly to state-owned firms and indirectly to small private 
firms through secondary lending via the SOEs (Allen, Yiming, Guoqian, & Frank, 2019), and the 
 7The Second National Economic Census, 2008 and Industrial Enterprises Survey Dataset, China Statistical Bureau.
 8See Shen et al. (2009)
 9ICBC 2011 Annual Report.
 10The term SME is used generically to mean the private sector. While there are some SMEs that are state-owned and some 
large enterprises (Huawei, Alibaba, Tencent, Baidu etc) that are private, the private sector is dominated by SMEs and MSEs 
(Medium Sized Enterprises) and most large enterprises are part of the state sector. Many large-scale joint ventures are also 
with SOEs or their subsidiaries and therefore cannot strictly be called private.
 11Estimates of the size of the shadow banking system vary from 25%–30% of SOCB bank assets according to recent estimates 
produced by JP Morgan.
 12As of 1 May 2015, the deposit insurance scheme covers deposits to maximum of 500,000RMB.
 13See also Cun and Li (2016), Chen et al. (2012), and Funke and Paetz (2012).
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sale of wealth management products. Combined with private equity and trust funds, the latter clients 
constitute the ‘shadow banks’ (see also Lin et al. 2015). Our aim is to build into the model the Chinese 
feature of most of the official lending being targeted to the state-owned enterprises and private invest-
ment being largely funded by the shadow banks. The state-owned bank lending to state-owned firms 
could be regarded as exogenously driven by state plans and might not be affected by banks’ charges 
because of implicit state guarantees. Thus, our model of loans might not apply to these firms; it might 
only apply to the shadow bank clients and so we would like to separate out these clients’ activities 
from those of the state-owned firms, both their loans and their investments.
It needs to be stressed that this is simply a theoretical possibility. The state-owned sector is ubiq-
uitous in China and is also in practice disciplined by incentives and controls inspired by economic 
logic. Although this logic and these incentives are not transparent to the outside observer, it may nev-
ertheless be the case that one should treat the state-owned sector as if in practice it behaves like the 
private sector in a western economy. However, we explore as best we can with the data available how 
the model will behave if the state-owned sector responds to the risk-free rate of interest, but the private 
sector only is assumed subject to the incentives created by credit charges.
Time-series data on private sector investment are either obtained directly (if available) or con-
structed based on the decomposition of fixed assets investment (if unavailable) from China Statistical 
Yearbooks. The ownership structure of China's enterprises has changed dramatically since the early 
1980’s, and the definition of the term ‘private’ is not a constant. To resolve uncertainties regarding 
the construction of a private investment data series, China's National Bureau of Statistics published 
in 2012 an instruction document on its definition for China. For the early years where the private in-
vestment data are unavailable, we follow the instruction to construct the data series. Clearly due to the 
complexity of the ownership change situation, the private investment data might have non-negligible 
measurement errors hence can at best be viewed as a close proxy to the true investment.
While no official figures are available, several estimates of the size of the shadow banking system 
in China are available in discrete form. The figures vary from 40% to 69% of GDP,14 however, even 
estimates drawn from the PBOC suggest a rapidly growing shadow banking sector that has only begun 
to decline in recent years. Figure 1 shows the estimated size of shadow bank credit as a per cent of 
GDP. It reached a peak in 2016 and has then fallen back as a result of the deleveraging policies of the 
Chinese authorities.
The model is extended so that this credit is mediated via the banks to the private sector. All other 
credit and investment are treated as exogenous. This addition constitutes the shadow banking variant 
of the model we consider in this paper.
3 |  THE MODEL
We utilize the New-Keynesian framework in our analysis of the Chinese economy including shadow 
banking. Specifically, we use the model proposed by Le, Meenagh, and Minford (2016), which ex-
tends the original SW model in the following ways. First, it allows for final goods and labour being 
sold and supplied to, respectively, in both perfectly competitive and imperfectly competitive markets. 
The reason for this is that neither pure DSGE models of the Neo-Classical RBC (NC) type or its 
New-Keynesian (NK) variant capture the stylized features of the labour market in that the NK model 
 14For example BBVA (Hong Kong), ‘Banking Watch’ 8 March 2013, estimate the size of the shadow banking sector as over 
50% of GDP in 2012 while JP Morgan (Hong Kong), ‘Shadow banking in China’ May 3 2013 estimate it as between 28% and 
69% of GDP in 2012 depending on definition.
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generated too little nominal variation while the NC model delivered too much. Le, Meenagh, Minford, 
and Wickens (2011) test a hybrid version that captures features of both models based on indirect in-
ference that is a superior representation of the post-war data for the USA. This hybrid is a weighted 
average of the corresponding NC and NK versions. Secondly, it incorporates the financial accelerator 
mechanism of Bernanke et al. (1999) to allow for the analysis of a banking/financial sector. Lastly, to 
make the model more realistic, and in the light of widespread developments in monetary policy, and 
microprudential policy, it allows for the effects of aggressive open market operations (“Quantitative 
Easing”, henceforth, QE) and an increase in intrusive bank regulation. In our model, the increase in 
bank regulation raises the cost of lending to firms. In a modelling sense the extra regulation is added 
as a credit friction in the form of unobserved shocks (휍1t, 휍2t). To add QE to the model it assumes that 
firms are required to put up collateral which is a fraction of their net worth. As base money (M0) is is-
sued it is acquired by firms from banks to be held as collateral. Here, we follow the lead of Williamson 
(2013). The extension we make in this paper is to include two types of intermediate-goods producing 
firms, SOEs and SMEs. They both must borrow in order to acquire capital from capital producers. 
SOEs borrow at the risk-free rate because of the implicit state guarantee. Banks lend to these firms at 
the risk-free rate. However, SMEs are risky. Because of interest rate controls and restrictive regula-
tions, banks lend to SMEs via the off-balance sheet route of supplying wealth management products 
which effectively place funds in the shadow banking sector.
The demand side of the model consists of intertemporal Euler equations that determine optimal 
consumption and investment in two production sectors. Let 휎c denote the intertemporal elasticity of 
substitution, 휆 the degree of habit formation, 훽 the household's discount factor, 훾 the trend growth rate 
of technology, 휙 the cost of adjusting the rate of investment and W∗L∗
C∗
 the steady-state ratio of labour 
income to consumption. The equation represents a weighted average of current, past and expected 
future consumption and labour as a function of the real interest 
(
rt−Et휋t+1
)
 and the intertemporal 
shock to preferences 휀b
t
.15
 15Note that consumption and leisure are assumed non-separable in the utility function as in Smets and Wouters (2007). This 
formulation was also used through other research such as in Le et al. (2011, 2016), where the whole model was estimated and 
tested against the unfiltered US data. To minimise the changes to the theoretical model, we keep this utility function 
specification.
F I G U R E  1  Shadow bank credit as a percent of GDP. Source: Goldman Sachs, and Moody's, and author 
calculations
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In each sector, intermediate-goods firms produce using labour which moves freely across the two 
sectors so that the labour composite is lt= N
SOE
N
nSOE
t
+
NSME
N
nSME
t
, where each sector labour is a combi-
nation of labour hired from imperfectly and perfectly labour markets, and capital is bought from the 
sector-specific capital producer. These firms produce intermediate goods under perfect competition 
assumptions, according to the Cobb-Douglas production function and use technology, capital and 
labour as inputs. Equations (2) and (3) describe the respective outputs of the two sectors.
where 훼i with i=SOE, SME denotes the share of capital in production and 휙 equals one plus the share 
of fixed costs in production. The demand for capital and labour in the two sectors are as follows.
and
where pWi
t
 is the relative price of wholesale output.
The capital producers are sector specific. The capital accumulation functions are as in (8) and (9).
where 훿 is the depreciation rate and assumed to be the same between the two sectors. It is assumed that 
there are increasing marginal investment adjustment costs and the productive capital is a fraction (
1−휑
(
Ii
t
Ii
t−1
))
 of output. Following this assumption, in each sector the price of new capital depends 
positively on the expected future marginal product of capital and the expected future value of capital 
and negatively on the real cost of borrowing as shown in (10) and (11) below:
(1)ct=
휆
훾
1+
휆
훾
ct−1+
1
1+
휆
훾
Etct+1+
�
휎c−1
�
W∗L∗
C∗�
1+
휆
훾
�
휎c
�
lt−Etlt+1
�
−
⎛⎜⎜⎜⎝
1−
휆
훾�
1+
휆
훾
�
휎c
⎞⎟⎟⎟⎠
�
rt−Et휋t+1
�
+휀b
t
(2)ySOE
t
=휙
[
훼SOEkSOE
t−1
+
(
1−훼SOE
)
nSOE
t
+휀SOE
t
]
(3)ySME
t
=휙
[
훼SMEkSME
t−1
+
(
1−훼SME
)
nSME
t
+휀SME
t
]
(4)mpkSOE
t
= ySOE
t
−kSOE
t−1
+pWSOE
t
(5)mpkSME
t
= ySME
t
−kSME
t−1
+pWSME
t
(6)nSOE
t
= ySOE
t
−wt+pW
SOE
t
(7)nSME
t
= ySME
t
−wt+pW
SME
t
(8)kSOE
t
=
(
1−훿
훾
)
kSOE
t−1
+
(
1−
1−훿
훾
)
invSOE
t
+
(
1−
1−훿
훾
)(
1+훽훾1−휎c
)
훾2휑휀SOEinv
t
(9)kSME
t
=
(
1−훿
훾
)
kSME
t−1
+
(
1−
1−훿
훾
)
invSME
t
+
(
1−
1−훿
훾
)(
1+훽훾1−휎c
)
훾2휑휀SMEinv
t
(10)qqSOE
t
=
1−훿
1−훿+RKSOE
∗
Etqq
SOE
t
+
RKSOE
∗
1−훿+RKSOE
∗
(
ySOE
t
−kSOE
t
+pWSOE
t
)
−
(
rt−Et휋t+1
)
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where Ri
∗
 with i=SOE, SME are the steady-state values of the return on capital and 훿 is the rate of 
capital depreciation. The Euler equations for investment in SOE and SME sectors specify the optimal 
investment plan. The weighted average of past, current and future investment in each sector depends 
on the price of new capital, qqi
t
, where i = SOE, SME,
Aggregate investment is a combination of two sectors investment
Firms producing intermediate goods in each sector hire labour from the organized labour sector and 
capital bought from the sector-specific capital producer. Since the SOE firms are assumed to be able to 
borrow at the risk-free rate, the price of capital will therefore depend negatively on this real risk-free rate 
interest. However, the firms in the SME sector are assumed to be risky and obtain loans at a risk premium 
from banks. There are many ways that banks can perform this lending channel to risky firms. One way is 
to lend at the risk-free rate plus a mark-up to high-value individuals or intermediary firms, who then pass 
it on, together with a slice of their own capital to risky SMEs. These intermediaries share the risks with 
SME firms to whom they are lending. The banks pay a risk-free rate on their deposits and make risky loans 
to SMEs. We can think of this as banks charging SMEs a higher premium than the rate at which they lend 
to SOEs. SMEs use the borrowing and their net worth together in purchasing the capital needed for future 
production. SMEs could reduce the premium by pledging a high net worth and/or pledging some of their 
cash collateral. Besides the cash collateral element taken from Le et al. (2016), the dynamics of the risk 
premium is as described in Bernanke et al. (1999). The SMEs risk premium is given by (15);
The risk premium is reduced with a higher cash collateral (mt) and a higher net worth relative to 
the gross value of capital (-(qqSME
t
+kSME
t
−nwSME
t
)),16 and rises with more regulations (휍1t)17 and ex-
(11)qqSMEt =
1−훿
1−훿+RKSME
∗
Etqq
SME
t
+
RKSME
∗
1−훿+RKSME
∗
(
ySME
t
−kSME
t
+pWSME
t
)
−
(
rt−Et휋t+1+st
)
(12)invSOEt =
1
1+훽훾(1−휎c)
invSOE
t−1
+
훽훾(1−휎c)
1+훽훾(1−휎c)
Etinv
SOE
t+1
+
1(
1+훽훾(1−휎c)
)
훾2휑
qqSOE
t
+휀SOEinv
t
(13)invSMEt =
1
1+훽훾(1−휎c)
invSME
t−1
+
훽훾(1−휎c)
1+훽훾(1−휎c)
Etinv
SME
t+1
+
1(
1+훽훾(1−휎c)
)
훾2휑
qqSME
t
+휀SMEinv
t
(14)invt=
INVSOE
INV
invSOE
t
+
INVSME
INV
invSME
t
(15)st=Etcyt+1−
(
rt−Et휋t+1
)
=휒
(
qqSME
t
+kSME
t
−nwSME
t
)
−휓1mt+휍1t+휀
pr
t
 16The balance sheet of the firm is fixed capital and cash as assets and loans and equity (net worth) as liabilities. The loans and 
equity are used to purchase capital goods. The higher the equity the lower the dependence on bank debt and the lower the 
riskiness of the firm and consequently the lower the risk premium. See Le et al. (2016a) for a theoretical underpinning.
 17Regulations here are interventions that raise the cost of capital to the firm such as increased bank capitalisation, but in the 
China context these will include shocks to the bank's reserve ratio, loan-deposit caps, window guidance, and quantitative 
controls on lending.
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ogenous shocks (휀prt ). There is also an assumption that in every period a fixed death rate 1−휃 happens 
so that the stock of SME firms is kept constant by an equal birth rate of new firms, and the net worth 
remains below the demand for capital. This means that the SMEs net worth is the past net worth of 
surviving firms plus their total return on capital minus the expected return (which is paid out in bor-
rowing costs to the bank) on the externally financed part of their capital stock.
where KSME
NWSME
 is the steady-state ratio of SMEs’ capital expenditures to SMEs net worth, cyt is the real 
external financing rate, 휍2t is a regulatory-specific shock to net worth and 휀NWt  represents all other 
net worth shocks. The regulations are the instruments that the central bank can also use to influence 
the credit premium and indirectly the net worth of the firms. However, since data on microprudential 
measures are very poor, for simplicity we include these in the errors 휀prt  and 휀NWt .
While the BGG net worth channel has been used extensively in the literature and is well known, 
the cash collateral variant requires greater elaboration. The idea of costly state verification is that net 
worth is all invested in plant, machinery and other capital and thus cannot be recovered at original 
value and has less value when the firm goes bankrupt because it has become specialized to the firm's 
activities. It is normal for banks also to request an amount of collateral (e.g., Kiyotaki and Moore, 
1997). If this collateral was in terms of cash, that is, a firm holds some cash on its balance sheet, this 
can be recovered directly without loss of value and no verification cost. The elimination of the col-
lateral cost helps to bring down the credit premium for given net worth and it allows firms to increase 
leverage and so raise their expected returns. It assumes that banks and SME firms have a mutual 
interest in firms holding as much cash as can be acquired for collateral. The process of cash being 
used as collateral is as follows. As the central bank issues cash through open market operations to 
households in exchange for government bonds they hold, households deposit cash with banks, firms 
want to acquire as much of this cash as possible for their collateral needs (they invest their net worth 
in cash to the maximum available with the rest going into other collateral and capital). In practice, 
the firms’ profits are continuously paid out as dividends to the banks which lend to them, so they 
have nothing with which to acquire these assets if they do not collaborate with banks. They achieve 
this balance sheet outcome by agreeing with the banks that, as a minimum counterpart to the credit 
advanced, they will hold the maximum cash collateral available, which is M0. Thus, all M0 at once 
finds its way to firm's balance sheet, where it is securely pledged to the banks in the event of 
bankruptcy.18
The resource constraint states that aggregate output yt depends on consumption, investment and 
an exogenous (government spending and net trade) shock, 휀G
t
 and it ignores the contribution from the 
entrepreneurs’ consumption as it is negligible.
The final goods producer would gather these intermediate goods with a CES production function 
into final goods and pay intermediate firms pWi
t
 with i=SOE, SME. The final output together is.
(16)nwSME
t
=휃nwSME
t−1
+
KSME
NWSME
(
cyt−Et−1cyt
)
+Et−1cyt+휍2t+휀
NW
t
 18There are many ways that money can be brought into a model such as this. The way we have done it is in the spirit of the 
credit channel where cash is pledged as collateral and serves to reduce the risk premium. A real-world feature is the 
availability of liquidity to the financial system which reduces interest rates and spreads.
(17)yt=
C
Y
ct+
I
Y
invt+휀
G
t
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where 휂 is the share of SOE output in total output.
Cost minimization implies the following demand for intermediate goods
where 휀 is the elasticity of substitution between the two intermediate goods.
Following Le et al. (2011), we assume that the final goods producers then sell a part of final goods 
in the competitive market at the marginal cost and it differentiates the rest and then marks up for sale 
in the market characterized by the nominal rigidities. Therefore, the model introduces the monopolis-
tic power and nominal price rigidities at the retail level. For simplicity, we solve for prices under the 
competitive market assumption and then under the imperfect competition assumption and take the 
weighted average between the two as the solution for the price in our model. Labour supply also works 
in the same way.19 Households supply labour to a regulated labour market and to competitive labour 
markets, so that the aggregate wage index is a weighted average of the perfectly competitive and im-
perfectly competitive wage levels. The imperfectly competitive market set-up gives the New-Keynesian 
Phillip curve where a weighted average of current, past and expected future inflation depends on the 
price mark-up and an exogenous cost-push shock to prices, 휀pt :
and the weighted average of current, past and expected future wages depends on the wage mark-up, 
inflation and a cost-push shock to wages, 휀W
t
:
The perfectly competitive market set-up produces the labour supply that reacts to expected 
inflation
(18)
yt =휂y
SOE
t
+(1−휂) ySME
t
(19)ySOE
t
=−휀pWSOE
t
+yt
(20)ySME
t
=−휀pWSME
t
+yt
 19As we are unaware of a long time series of wage for SOEs and SMEs, this modelling convenience enables us to work with a 
single wage series.
(21)
휋t =
훽훾(1−휎c)
1+훽훾(1−휎c)휄p
Et휋t+1+
휄p
1+훽훾(1−휎c)휄p
휋t−1
+
(
1
1+훽훾(1−휎c)휄p
)((
1−훽훾1−휎c휉p
) (
1−휉p
)
휉p
((
휙p−1
)
휀p+1
) ) (휂pWSOEt +(1−휂) pWSMEt )+휀pt
(22)
wt =
훽훾(1−휎c)
1+훽훾(1−휎c)
�
Etwt+1+Et휋t+1
�
+
1
1+훽훾(1−휎c)
wt−1−
1+훽훾(1−휎c)휄w
1+훽훾(1−휎c)
휋t+
휄w
1+훽훾(1−휎c)
휋t−1
−
�
1
1+훽훾(1−휎c)
���
1−훽훾1−휎c휉w
� �
1−휉w
�
휉w
��
휙p−1
�
휀w+1
� � ⎛⎜⎜⎝wt−휎llt−
⎛⎜⎜⎝ 11− 휆훾
⎞⎟⎟⎠
�
ct−
휆
훾
ct−1
�⎞⎟⎟⎠+휀
w
t
(23)wt=휎Llt+
⎛⎜⎜⎝ 11− 휆훾
⎞⎟⎟⎠
�
ct−
휆
훾
ct−1
�
−
�
휋t−Et−1휋t
�
   | 13LE Et aL.
and the natural log of real marginal costs for the final goods producer must be equal to zero
To close the model, we allow the short-term rate on official lending to the banks to be set by the 
PBOC in accordance with a Taylor Rule. We assume that the PBOC enforces this rule via open market 
operations. That is, households hold part of their savings in government bonds and the rest in bank 
deposits, which pay the short-term interest rate also obtainable on short-term government bonds. In 
order to control the short-term rate, the PBOC would sell/buy the long-term government bond to buy/
sell the short-term government bonds to influence the prices of these assets and thus their rates. Cash 
is issued in this model, but is only held by firms, as households have no use for it and deposit it in 
banks where it is lent to firms to hold as collateral and affect the credit premium. Beside the regula-
tions, the monetary authorities therefore have two instruments, M0 and r:
where 휓2 is positive and Mt is the supply of money, which is defined as the sum of deposits and 
base money. Using the firms’ balance sheet, the money supply is expressed as a function of base 
money, capital and net worth, υ, μ and c are, respectively, the ratios of net worth, M0 and collateral 
to money,
This now gives our monetary authorities three instruments: base money, the interest rate and mi-
croprudential policy.
4 |  THE METHOD OF INDIRECT INFERENCE
We evaluate the model's capacity in fitting the data using the method of II originally proposed in 
Minford, Theodoridis, and Meenagh (2009). The approach employs an auxiliary model that is com-
pletely independent of the theoretical one to produce a description of the data against which the per-
formance of the theory is evaluated indirectly. Such a description can be summarized either by the 
estimated parameters of the auxiliary model or by functions of these; we will call these the descriptors 
of the data. While these are treated as the ‘reality’, the theoretical model being evaluated is simulated 
to find its implied values for them.
Indirect inference has been widely used in the estimation of structural models (e.g., Canova, 2005; 
Gregory & Smith, 1991, 1993, Gourieroux, Monfort, & Renault, 1993; Gourieroux & Monfort, 1995; 
Smith, 1993). Here, we make a further use of indirect inference to evaluate an already estimated or 
calibrated structural model. The common element is the use of an auxiliary time-series model.20 In 
estimation, the parameters of the structural model are chosen such that when this model is simulated 
it generates estimates of the auxiliary model similar to those obtained from the actual data. The 
(24)휀pWSOE
t
+(1−휀) pWSME
t
=0
(25)rt=휌rt−1+(1−휌)
(
휌휋휋t+휌yyt+휌Δy
(
yt−yt−1
))
+emt
(26)Δmt=휓2ΔMt+errm2t
(27)Mt=(1+휈−휇) kt+휇mt−휈nt
 20This is not the first model of the Chinese economy to take this approach. Le et al. (2014) use II to estimate a more 
aggregative structure than that proposed in this paper, and Dai et al. (2015) test the method of II on a DSGE model.
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optimal choices of parameters for the structural model are those that minimize the distance between 
a given function of the two sets of estimated coefficients of the auxiliary model. Common choices of 
this function are the actual coefficients, the scores or the impulse response functions. In model eval-
uation, the parameters of the structural model are taken as given. The aim is to compare the perfor-
mance of the auxiliary model estimated on simulated data derived from the given estimates of a 
structural model—which is taken as a true model of the economy, the null hypothesis—with the 
performance of the auxiliary model when estimated from the actual data. If the structural model is 
correct then its predictions about the impulse responses, moments and time-series properties of the 
data should statistically match those based on the actual data. The comparison is based on the distri-
butions of the two sets of parameter estimates of the auxiliary model, or of functions of these 
estimates.
The testing procedure thus involves first constructing the errors implied by the previously esti-
mated/calibrated structural model and the data. These are called the structural errors and are backed 
out directly from the equations and the data.21 These errors are then bootstrapped and used to generate 
for each bootstrap new data based on the structural model. An auxiliary time-series model is then fit-
ted to each set of data and the sampling distribution of the coefficients of the auxiliary time-series 
model is obtained from these estimates of the auxiliary model. A Wald statistic is computed to deter-
mine whether functions of the parameters of the time-series model estimated on the actual data lie in 
some confidence interval implied by this sampling distribution.
Following Le, Meenagh, Minford, Wickens, and Xu (2016) we use as the auxiliary model a VECM 
which we re-express as a VAR(1) for the three macrovariables (interest rate, output gap and inflation) 
with a time trend and with the productivity residual entered as an exogenous non-stationary process 
(these two elements having the effect of achieving co-integration—Le, Meenagh, Minford, & 
Ou, 2013). Thus, our auxiliary model in practice is given by: yt=Ayt−1+훾xt−1+gt+vt, where xt−1 is 
the stochastic trend in productivity, gt are the deterministic trends and vt are the VECM innovations. 
We treat as the descriptors of the data the VAR coefficients (on the endogenous variables only, (A)). 
The Wald statistic is computed from these.22 Thus, effectively we are testing whether the observed 
dynamics and volatility of the chosen variables are explained by the simulated joint distribution of 
these at a given confidence level.
The joint distribution of the Φ (the vector of VAR estimates) is obtained by bootstrapping the in-
novations implied by the data and the theoretical model; it is therefore an estimate of the small sample 
distribution.23 Such a distribution is generally more accurate for small samples than the asymptotic 
distribution; it is also shown to be consistent by Le et  al.  (2011) given that the Wald statistic is 
 21Some equations may involve calculation of expectations. The method we use here is the robust instrumental variables 
estimation suggested by McCallum (1976) and Wickens (1982): we set the lagged endogenous data as instruments and 
calculate the fitted values from a VAR(1) — this also being the auxiliary model chosen in what follows.
 22We do not attempt to match the time trends and the coefficients on non-stationary trend productivity; we assume that the 
model coefficients yielding these balanced growth paths and effects of trend productivity on the steady state are chosen 
accurately. However, for our exercise, we are not interested here in any effects on the balanced growth path, as this is fixed. 
As for the effects of productivity shocks on the steady state we assume that any inaccuracy in this will not importantly affect 
the business cycle analysis we are doing here- any inaccuracy would be important in assessing the effect on the steady state 
which is not our focus. Thus, our assessment of the model is as if we were filtering the data into stationary form by regressing 
it on the time trends and trend productivity. The Wald statistic is given by: (Φ−Φ)�∑−1
(ΦΦ)
(Φ−Φ), where Φ is the vector of 
VAR estimates of the chosen descriptors yielded in each simulation, with Φ and ∑
(ΦΦ) representing the corresponding sample 
means and variance-covariance matrix of these calculated across simulations, respectively.
 23The bootstraps in our tests are all drawn as time vectors so contemporaneous correlations between the innovations are 
preserved.
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‘asymptotically pivotal’; they also showed it had quite good accuracy in small sample Monte Carlo 
experiments.24
This testing procedure is applied to a set of (structural) parameters put forward as the true ones (H0
, the null hypothesis); they can be derived from calibration, estimation or both. However derived, the 
test then asks: could these coefficients within this model structure be the true (numerical) model gen-
erating the data? Of course, only one true model with one set of coefficients is possible. Nevertheless, 
we may have chosen coefficients that are not exactly right numerically, so that the same model with 
other coefficient values could be correct. Only when we have examined the model with all coefficient 
values that are feasible within the model theory will we have properly tested it. For this reason, we 
later extend our procedure by a further search algorithm, in which we seek alternative coefficient sets 
that could do better in the test.
Thus, we calculate the minimum-value full Wald statistic using an algorithm in which search takes 
place over a wide range around the initial values. In effect this is Indirect Inference estimation of the 
model; however, here this estimation is being done to find whether the model can be rejected in itself 
and not for the sake of finding the most satisfactory estimates of the model parameters. Nevertheless, 
of course the method does this latter task as a by-product so that we can use the resulting unrejected 
model as representing the best available estimated version. The merit of this extended procedure is 
that we are comparing the best possible versions of each model type when finally conducting our 
comparison of model compatibility with the data.
5 |  ESTIMATION AND MODEL FIT
A description and the source of the data used can be found in Table 2 and the descriptive statistics are 
in Table 3.
The model is estimated using the method of II for the 1992–2016 period. It is tested against the 
data using the main macroeconomic variables, output, inflation and the interest rate. We use a test of 
whether the model can match the time-series properties of the data jointly.
The reason for the choice of these particular variables is that we want the model to be able to ex-
plain the variables that macroeconomists and policymakers are most interested in. The focus of the 
paper is not about modelling shadow banking in reality, but whether a model that includes shadow 
banking, as here, can match the general macroeconomic environment. If the model can match these 
variables, then we can use the model to explore policies that may improve these variables’ behaviour. 
The reason we have chosen only three variables is because of the power of the Indirect Inference test. 
As the number of variables in the auxiliary model increases, so does the power of the test because the 
model will be required to replicate more detailed features of the data. Including too many variables 
will result in no model being able to pass the test. Using three variables in the auxiliary model has 
been shown to be a good balance of high power and model tractability (Meenagh, Minford, Wickens, 
& Xu, 2019).
The model is not rejected by the data according to the Wald statistic and p-values representing 
conventional levels of significance. The estimated parameters can be found in Table  4. We show 
three impulse response functions to key variables when the model is applied to non-stationary data in 
Figure 2. Note that the second set of IRFs in the figure is due to a non-stationary productivity shock.
 24Specifically, they found on stationary data that the bias due to bootstrapping was just over 2% at the 95% confidence level 
and 0.6% at the 99% level. Meenagh et al. (2019) found even greater accuracy in Monte Carlo experiments on non-stationary 
data.
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T A B L E  2  Description and source of the data
Variable Description Source
Consumption Real household final consumption 
expenditure
National Bureau of Statistics of China
GDP Real gross domestic product OECD Quarterly National Accounts
Labour Employment Oxford Economics
CPI Consumer price index OECD Economic Outlook
Wages Average overall wages for staff and 
workers in Urban units
Ministry of Human Resources and Social Security, 
China
Interest rate Discount rate IMF—International Financial Statistics
Lending rate Lending rate IMF—International Financial Statistics
Net worth Shanghai stock exchange stock 
market capitalization
Shanghai Stock Exchange
M0 Money supply M0 The People's Bank of China
Total credit Credit to private non-financial 
sector
Bank for International Settlements
Shadow credit Shadow banking credit Goldman Sachs and Moody's and author 
calculations
M2 Total credit+shadow credit The People's Bank of China and author calculations
Total investment Total investment National Bureau of Statistics China
Private investment Private fixed investment National Bureau of Statistics China & I-Find 
Financial Database
Population Population World Bank
T A B L E  3  Descriptive statistics of the data (1992Q1–2016Q4)
  Mean SD Min Max
Consumption (% GDP) 41.550 4.139 35.485 47.395
Investment (% GDP) 49.566 17.950 27.815 83.113
Annual Output (Growth)% 9.235 3.060 3.724 16.294
Labour (millions) 730.301 36.333 656.562 776.030
Annual Inflation% 0.971 1.528 −1.043 6.552
Annual real Wage (Growth)% 9.643 3.595 −0.528 17.304
Interest Rate% 4.694 2.643 2.700 10.440
Net Worth (billions) 8,316.014 9,142.408 6.534 34,669.084
Premium% 2.198 0.791 0.090 4.140
Lending Rate% 6.891 2.103 4.350 12.060
Real M0 (Growth)% 7.607 5.654 −3.912 28.514
Real M2 (Growth)% 18.196 5.548 2.622 30.340
Private Investment (% GDP) 24.718 14.542 9.108 51.806
Other Investment (% GDP) 24.848 3.717 18.707 32.805
Shadow Banking Credit (% GDP) 79.322 90.686 8.953 324.072
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Broadly the parameters reveal that in China the structure of the product market is strongly com-
petitive while the labour market operates in an imperfectly competitive market. In the imperfectly 
competitive labour market wages are rigid, and there is little wage indexation. In the small proportion 
of the goods market that is imperfectly competitive prices are very sticky. Output in the SOE sector is 
more capital intensive than the SME sector.
From the IRFs we can also see that the SMEs react more to a monetary policy shock than the 
SOEs due to the financial accelerator mechanism. This result contrasts with the consensus view that 
the effect of monetary policy on output is dampened as firms switch from conventional bank credit to 
shadow bank credit (e.g., Chen, Ren, & Zha, 2018). We find here that a tightening of monetary policy 
has a stronger effect on the SME sector than the financially protected SOE sector.
When there is a permanent productivity shock to the SME sector it pulls resources from the SOEs 
to permanently increase SME output at the cost of SOE output. Overall output still expands as the 
SME sector is dominant. A positive premium shock increases the cost of borrowing for SMEs, de-
creasing investment and output. Consequently, resources move to the SOEs boosting investment and 
output. The overall effect on the economy is a decrease in output. A money supply shock causes the 
SMEs to have cheaper collateral, thus reducing their premium having an opposite macroeconomic 
effect to that of a positive premium shock.
T A B L E  4  Coefficient estimates (1992–2016)
Elasticity of consumption 휎c 2.8544
Steady-state elasticity of capital adjustment 휑 9.1094
External habit formation 휆 0.0001
Elasticity of labour supply 휎l 1.1497
Probability of not changing prices (SME) 휉p 0.9008
Price indexation (SME) 휄p 0.0281
Probability of not changing wages 휉w 0.8122
Wage indexation 휄w 0.1264
Substitution between demand for SOE and SME intermediate goods 휀 2.1414
Elasticity of the premium with respect to leverage 휒 0.0098
Elasticity of the premium to M0 휓
1
0.0265
Monetary response 휓
2
0.0052
Interest rate smoothing 휌 0.8647
Taylor Rule response to inflation 휌휋 2.5126
Taylor Rule response to output 휌y 0.2998
Taylor Rule response to change in output 휌Δy 0.0487
NK weight on inflation 휔휋 0.0899
NK weight on wage 휔w 0.9979
Cobb Douglas weight on SOE output 훼SOE 0.5502
Cobb Douglas weight on SME output 훼SME 0.1364
  Wald 17.4968
  Trans. wald 1.5250
  p value 0.0600
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5.1 | The errors driving the episode of the GFC
What does the model say about the periodof the GFC? We begin by showing the behaviour of the 
main model errors from 2006. We can see from Figure 3 that there was turbulence over the GFC pe-
riod in many of these shocks. We can single out ones where this was greatest. Exogenous demand 
shows the collapse of world trade at the end of 2008. There are parallel falls in consumption and 
F I G U R E  2  IRFs for productivity shock, premium shock and M0 shock
F I G U R E  3  Shocks from 2006 to 2016
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investment by SMEs, along with productivity. The price mark-up fluctuated with world commodity 
price movements.25 The Taylor Rule error appears to be associated with these and with world trade 
movements. There is a strong shock coming via M0, which rose sharply during 2009 by Bank policy, 
which also saw a reduction in the premium as banks were encouraged to lend.
Clearly, the GFC had international ramifications, but we cannot identify the causality of these in a 
China-only model. The shocks that show up in the model are partly coming from these international 
effects. Thus, commodity price shocks that enter through the ‘price mark-up’ here are themselves 
responding to the crisis. Also, the exogenous demand shock, which consists of government spending 
and net exports, contains the international downturn in world trade.
A further limitation of our account is our inability to analyse connections between the shocks to 
the model. No doubt the financial shocks we identify had simultaneous and lagged effects on the 
non-financial shocks; but also vice versa. The model assumes that each shock is separate from the 
others and only related to its own past. The model then disentangles how each shock works through 
the economy to affect final outcomes. Anyone that wished to take matters further would have to model 
the interactions of the shocks themselves through a wider model, such as one of political economy.
Overall, we can see that there was a wide set of shocks hitting the Chinese economy during the 
GFC period, the major ones being external but in turn triggering domestic counterpart shocks. The 
Chinese authorities’ response was, as we know, to compel the SOCBs to lend for investment projects, 
mainly infrastructure. We can see this response in the SOE investment error, which turns sharply pos-
itive from the end of 2011. We can also see a strong reaction to the crisis in government spending in 
the years following the crisis.
We next look at the variance decomposition of the model. Again, we are using unfiltered data when 
performing this analysis which treats the episode stochastically—that is, we take the shocks in the 
episode and replay them by redrawing them randomly and repeatedly. For the variance decomposition 
we consider the financial shocks to be the premium, net worth, money supply and monetary policy.26 
What we see from Table 5 is that financial shocks account for only 15% of total output variance, with 
a much larger per cent of SME output variance (22%) due to financial shocks than SOE output (2%). 
This is mainly due to the monetary policy and net worth shocks. The rest is due to the usual non-fi-
nancial shocks. This is also the case for investment, but the difference is not as stark. The monetary 
policy shock is not so important, with the other financial shocks increasing in importance.
Of the non-financial shocks, the non-stationary productivity shocks dominate, especially in the SOE 
sector. The investment shocks also play a prominent role. In sum, there is a distinct role for financial 
shocks, but the bulk of the variation comes from the other shocks: notably productivity and investment.
Figure 4 shows the historical decomposition for output. At the start of the GFC period there was 
an initial slowdown in GDP. From the decomposition we find that this is mainly driven by exogenous 
demand, which had a positive effect on output before the GFC struck, then shifts to a negative effect 
quite rapidly. There is also a reduction in the positive effect of SME productivity. The slowdown in 
GDP after 2012 is due to a large drop in SME productivity as well as a reduction in SOE productivity.
We can now examine the question whether a reasonable attempt to allow explicitly for the role of 
the shadow banks makes any material difference to the model's conclusions. We can get a feel for the 
answer by looking at the sum of net worth and premium shocks. The answer is that it makes a huge 
 25Jian et al. (2010) use a standard sticky-price DSGE, to identify the effects of oil price shocks on productivity. They confirm 
that oil price shocks have permanent negative effects on output.
 26It may seem strange to include the M0 error among financial shocks when its rise at the end of the period reflects a strong 
policy response. However, in this it parallels the behaviour of the credit premium shock in the US which was clearly a 
financial shock but also later embodied a strong policy response in the form of bank bailout.
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difference to private (SME) investment, but not to total output. This clearly makes sense as private in-
vestment is more responsive to the premium being less exposed to the cheap credit available to SOEs. 
However, the SME sector is less capital intensive than the SOE sector which explains the dampened 
effect on total output. The basic result is that shadow banking shocks make up about one fifth of the 
variance of private sector investment but only 3% of the variance of total output.
What lessons can we draw for China from the above analysis? China has maintained robust eco-
nomic growth throughout the GFC relative to its western counterpart. So, a crisis such as negative 
growth has never occurred. To project into future, we thus need an appropriate definition of extremely 
undesirable growth outcomes, which will be termed as severe economic slowdowns (SES) hereafter. 
Given the recent experience in China, we define a SES as a growth slowdown below that of the as-
sumed balanced growth path (BGP) of 6% per year for a sustained period.
What does this model have to say in general about the causes of these slowdowns? We examine this 
question by inspecting the bootstrap experience (potential scenarios over the period) from the model 
and its normal shocks. Again, this analysis is done on unfiltered data. Table 6 shows the frequency of 
economic growth slowdown generated from repeated simulation of 1,000 bootstraps using the shocks 
generated for the full period and compare this with the same for the period of the GFC.
The way to interpret Table 6 is that each column shows the number of times per 1,000 years of 
simulation that growth will fall below a specific rate for a given length of time. So, in the first column 
F I G U R E  4  Historical decomposition for output
T A B L E  6  Frequency of economic growth slowdown generated by the model for the whole sample and the post-
GFC sample
Length (quarters) Length (quarters)
1992–2016 4 8 12 2006–2016 4 8 12
Growth % 5 148 60 20 Growth % 5 162 77 33
3 111 35 9 3 130 49 17
0 62 12 2 0 76 20 4
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of the left side of Table 6, the number 148 is the number of times in 1,000 years of simulations that 
growth falls below 5% for a period of four quarters. Another way of thinking about it is that China 
could experience a growth slowdown of 5% every 7 years (1000/148). The next element in the same 
column is 111 which says that the frequency of growth slowdown of 4% is 111 times per 1,000 years, 
or every 9 years. Given the history of shocks over this sample period, the model states that the fre-
quency of growth slowdown diminishes with the severity and length.
The right side of Table 6 shows the same analysis using the shocks of the crisis period to 2016. 
Here, we can see that the frequency of growth slowdowns is a little higher. A growth slowdown of 5% 
for four quarters occurs 162 times per 1,000 years, or every 6 years. Zero growth for four quarters oc-
curs every 13 years. The GFC did make a difference to the Chinese economy, but principally through 
the exogenous shocks to trade. This result confirms the insulation of the Chinese banking sector from 
the GFC and that its impact was indirect through trade.
Clearly the simulations reveal normal economic fluctuations of the Chinese market economy: this 
economy will generate growth slowdowns regularly from ‘standard’ shock sequences. The model pre-
dicts that without additional reforms and innovations, a growth slowdown of 3% lasting 2 years would 
occur every 29 years, and a zero-growth prospect (which for a China accustomed to regular 6% plus is 
a severe interruption) every 83 years. This reflects the fact that shocks in this sample period were not 
as large as for some earlier periods in China.
Clearly these figures are affected by the nature of the sample shocks; here, we have used the experi-
ence of the last two decades, which apart from the crisis itself was the period of the Great Moderation 
in the world economy. As we know that the variance of shocks in this period was markedly lower 
than in earlier post-war history, extending our sample backwards in time would no doubt change our 
estimates in detail.
So, what does this all say about the Chinese financial sector and its economy? Some of the extreme 
scenarios we have just considered such as 3% or zero growth are surely unacceptable for China, and 
means have to be found to respond to slowing growth quickly so as to prevent it getting to such a 
scale—much as was done during the GFC. The means the Chinese state has found are in the existence 
of one economy two systems: the publicly owned alongside the private sector. The state still directly 
owns half the banking system and it still controls more than half of the economy. The state-owned 
banks (SOCBs) and firms (SOEs) act as twin channels through which the government can rapidly 
respond to events where necessary. Thus, in the GFC, the SOCBs were required to lend to SOEs: the 
response is visible in the SOE investment residual which picks up sharply from the start of 2011 on-
wards. Additionally, central and local government directly spent on infrastructure and consumption, 
this time funded directly by the Central Bank. This response too is visible in the behaviour of the 
exogenous demand residual from 2011 onwards.
6 |  CONCLUSIONS
The method of indirect inference was used to estimate the model which was then used to carry out an 
accounting exercise in the shocks causing the growth slowdown in the GFC episode. The estimation 
was done on unfiltered data, allowing for non-stationary shocks. The model was not rejected by the 
data and a variance decomposition was conducted to establish what a typical crisis generated by these 
shocks if redrawn randomly would be caused by. Two simulations exercises were conducted using 
two different sets of the shocks in the sample to shed light on the causes of growth slowdown and the 
growth slowdown associated with the GFC in particular. The conclusion of the exercise is perhaps not 
very surprising. China experienced a growth slowdown rather than a precipitous drop in output as in 
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the rest of the world. The cause was mainly the result of external shocks from world trade and com-
modity prices, which in turn triggered responses from the Chinese authorities in the form of monetary 
policy shocks and shocks to investment (via targeted loans from state banks). Financial shocks as 
identified by the model played only a minor role, although they added to fluctuations over the whole 
period to date.
The model also tells us that growth slowdowns, even recessions, are regular occurrences in market 
economies, as in China, and that they frequently will have as their by-product financial roots in the 
sense that the premium rises sharply. These slowdowns will occur despite there being no extreme 
financial shocks such as that occurred in the GFC; so serious financial shocks are not required for 
severe growth slowdowns to happen. Furthermore, extreme financial shocks on their own of the type 
identified in this sample can cause temporary recessions. Thus, both severe economic downturns and 
financial crises result from non-financial shocks, and naturally financial shocks if extreme enough 
will add an extra layer to the already undesirable outcomes.
However, it must be stressed that the financial shocks identified in this sample all occurred in a po-
litical environment where the Chinese government acted aggressively with counter-cyclical loans for 
investment by SOEs and infrastructure spending by central and provincial governments; absent this, 
the scale of these shocks would have been very different. So what this work tells us about the current 
Chinese banking system is that, firstly, the use of directed credit to the state firms in times of crisis 
served the Chinese economy well in the short term, helping it to avoid the worst of the global down-
turn. However, this policy if became systematic could create instability as shown in Le et al. (2014) 
and the longer-term implications of focussing lending on state firms and starving the high growth 
private sector could return to haunt the banks with bad debts in the future.
While it can be argued that private firms are able to finance investment through the unregulated 
shadow banking system, the concentration of the country's main regular banking system on the low 
productive state sector represents a colossal misallocation of resources. Further study on the relation-
ship between investment by private enterprises and shadow bank financing is called for. Until better 
information on the relationship of private investment to state-sponsored investment is available so that 
the effects of the shadow banking sector can properly understood, any conclusion on the stability of 
the economy with a shadow banking sector must be tentative. The attempts by the Chinese regulators 
to use the banking system for aggressive stabilization of the economy in the face of imported crisis 
may be breeding instability for the future.
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